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Abstract
Moral hazard in public insurance for long-term care may be counteracted by strategies influencing supply or demand.
Demand-side strategies may target the patient or the insurer. Various demand-side strategies and how they are imple-
mented in four European countries (Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands) are described, highlighting the
pros and cons of each strategy. Patient-oriented strategies to counteract moral hazard are used in all four countries but
their impact on efficiency is unclear and crucially depends on their design. Strategies targeted at insurers are much less
popular: Belgium and Switzerland have introduced elements of managed competition for some types of long-term care, as
has the Netherlands in 2015. As only some elements of managed competition have been introduced, it is unclear whether
it improves efficiency. Its effect will depend on the feasibility of setting appropriate financial incentives for insurers using
risk equalization and the willingness of governments to provide insurers with instruments to manage long-term care.
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Introduction
Affordable, universal, comprehensive insurance helps to
ensure access to long-term care (LTC) for the elderly. But
LTC insurance suffers from ex-postmoral hazard because
patients do not bear the full cost of the services that they
use and because insurance gives their relatives an incen-
tive to stop providing informal care.Moral hazard causes
substitution of more expensive formal LTC both for
informal care and for less expensive LTC and may
increase the number of people who claim benefits. Thus,
moral hazard leads to use beyond the point where the
marginal benefits equal the marginal costs.
The negative consequences of moral hazard may be
mitigated by strategies limiting the supply – targeting
providers – or the demand for LTC – targeting patients
or insurers. This article is about the latter, which may
consist either of cost sharing and coverage restrictions
that change the patients’ marginal cost of use, or man-
aged competition, which may turn insurers into prudent
buyers of care.
Under managed competition, supply and demand
determine the allocation of insurance contracts sold
by competing insurers to individuals, subject to govern-
ment regulation of the benefit package and premium
setting (e.g. through compulsory community rating),
an open enrolment requirement, and a system of risk
equalization.1 Managed competition may enhance effi-
cient health care provision by giving insurers financial
incentives to act as prudent buyers of health services on
behalf of their subscribers. The role of managed com-
petition in health care and its proper scope have been a
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major topic in health economics.1–3 Whether managed
competition may be an appropriate way to finance LTC
depends, among other things, on whether insurers can
be provided with appropriate instruments and incen-
tives to act as prudent buyers of LTC and whether a
sufficient proportion of consumers will (be able to) act
as critical buyers of LTC benefits offered by insurers.2
In practice, several versions of demand-side strate-
gies have been implemented in four European countries
that finance LTC through public insurance as opposed
to subsidizing LTC from general taxation – Belgium,
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
We focus on two questions. Do the ways in which
demand-side strategies are currently implemented in
these countries provide incentives to curb the impact
of moral hazard on allocative efficiency and expend-
itures? And do these strategies have adverse effects on
universal access to basic LTC? The answers to these
questions highlight the consequences of design choices
regarding demand-side measures. These answers gener-
ate hypotheses about causal relationships between
demand-side measures and outcomes and suggest how
each of these countries – and other countries with simi-
lar policies – may change their policies. The variation in
demand-side measures may have many reasons. It is
unlikely, however, that this variation is due to differ-
ences in the technical feasibility of these measures
because this is largely determined by the LTC financing
system, which is quite similar in all four countries.
Hence, their experience with the various measures
may be transferable across these countries.
Strategies to reduce moral hazard
Policies targeting patients aim to limit their demand.
One such policy is ‘independent eligibility assessment’.
In health care, eligibility is usually determined by pro-
viders. But to limit the influence of providers, in LTC
this task is often entrusted to independent assessment
agencies. Eligibility assessment aims to curb unneces-
sary LTC use by limiting the care that patients can
receive. Assessment criteria help to ensure formal care
is restricted to that which is needed. Criteria regarding
the availability of informal care are used to prevent
substitution of formal care for informal care.
Governments may also curb demand for LTC
through cost sharing, providing benefits in-kind, reim-
bursement limits, coverage restrictions and means test-
ing. Cost sharing reduces the gap between the total
marginal costs and the marginal costs to the patients
and thus limits moral hazard and its negative conse-
quences. The impact of cost sharing on efficiency
depends on how it is designed and how patients react
to it. In the absence of transaction costs, the ideal cost
sharing arrangement is tailored to the price sensitivity
of each patient. So cost sharing that takes at least some
of the differences in price sensitivity into account is
therefore more efficient than having a single tariff for
everyone. Moreover, cost sharing that accounts for dif-
ferences in income and wealth guarantees financial
access to LTC for poorer individuals.
Providing benefits in-kind rather than giving cash
benefits may limit moral hazard by making claiming
unnecessary benefits less attractive. However, the net
impact of the restriction is unclear as it limits the ability
of patients to coordinate formal and informal LTC and
ensure efficient substitution, which might generate sub-
stantial gains if they are sufficiently informed. In-kind
transfers are unlikely to have a direct impact on uni-
versal access to basic LTC.
Reimbursement limits and coverage restrictions pre-
vent excessive use by limiting the amount and the types
of benefits that patients with LTC may claim. Strict
reimbursement limits and coverage restrictions may
have an adverse impact on universal access to
basic LTC: while more affluent patients are able to
pay for the basic care that is not covered, poorer
patients may not.
A means test limits some potential beneficiaries
through eligibility criteria related to income or
wealth. Therefore, it reduces LTC expenditures but
does not affect the allocation in other ways; a means
test does not prevent inefficient substitution and over-
use by eligible individuals. The benefits need to be set at
a low level to prevent strategic behaviour, such as
through transfers within the family.4 When the benefits
are set at a very low level, means testing may impede
universal access to basic LTC.
Another demand-side strategy is managed competi-
tion, which aims to provide third party payers with incen-
tives to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their
patients. These incentives come from the need to compete
for enrolees and from making insurers financially
accountable for (part of) the difference between risk
adjusted capitation payments they receive for their enro-
lees and the incurred expenses.1
Current policies targeting the consumer
This section discusses the demand-side measures target-
ing patients in each of the four countries. All four coun-
tries have a public insurance system for LTC and at
least some mandatory public insurance coverage for
home care and institutional care. But the financing
and organization of LTCs differs in four aspects
between these countries (Table 1): the overall share of
gross domestic product (GDP) spent on LTC for the eld-
erly; the LTC financing mix, including the importance of
public spending on LTC; public insurance coverage for
LTC; the design of the public LTC financing system.
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We will first discuss policies in Belgium and
Switzerland, which have integrated public insurance
for health care and LTC. Next we discuss policies in
Germany and the Netherlands, which in 2014 had sep-
arate public insurance schemes for LTC.
Belgium and Switzerland
Coverage for health care and for medical LTC is inte-
grated in the public health insurance scheme (Table 1).
Medical LTC is defined as the assessment of needs and
provision of advice, medical care and support with
Activities of Daily Living.9,10 Non-medical home care
services, which are not covered through the integrated
public insurance scheme, are financed by local and
regional governments. Cantons in Switzerland, for
example, provide subsidies for domestic care.
Furthermore, they pay part of the LTC costs that are
not paid by health insurers, whose contribution is fixed
at roughly 55% of the costs of medical LTC. In
Belgium, the organization and funding of non-medical
home care is taken up by the regional governments and
there are cash allowances to pay for assistance. A cash
allowance is paid out to the disabled who are at least 65
years of age. The amount depends on the recipients’ use
of care and on their financial situation. In Flanders, a
complementary cash allowance is a fixed amount for all
disabled, regardless of their age, income or wealth.7
Table 2. Demand-side measures and the expected effects on efficiency and access.
Policy measure
Expected effect
on efficiency
Expected effect on
access to LTC
Belgium
Standardized, independent eligibility assessment Positive Undetermined
Limited benefit package Positivea Negativeb
Co-payments, related to income, assets, household composition
and type and duration of care
Positivea Limited
Managed competition: limited financial risk, extensive risk
adjustment
Limited Limited
Germany
Standardized, independent eligibility assessment based on health
and disability
Positive Undetermined
Low, fixed-level benefits Positive Negative
Limited benefit package Positivea Negativeb
Cash benefits Undeterminedc Limited
Netherlandsd
Standardized eligibility assessment based on health, disability and
informal care availability
Positive Undetermined
Co-payments: income-related and asset-related Positivea Limited
Cash benefits Undeterminedc Limited
Switzerland
Eligibility determined by providers, insurers may audit Positive Undetermined
Limited benefit package for non-medical LTC Positive Negativeb
Co-payments and deductibles for medical LTC Positivea Negative
Managed competition: full financial risk for insurers, limited risk
adjustment
Undeterminede Negative
aOut-of-pocket payments reduce the gap between the total marginal cost and the marginal cost for the care recipient and thus improve the allocation
by making the care recipient more cost conscious. But out-of-pocket payment may also cause to forego necessary care and may thus lead to higher
demand for care in the long run. The impact of out-of-pocket payments on efficiency is positive if the former effect dominates the latter.
bAssistance from the local and federal government may provide relief.
cAssuming that the choice between cash benefits and in-kind provision does not affect the health of the recipient, the impact on efficiency depends on
whether the gain from efficient substitution between formal and informal care and the discount exceed the decrease in efficiency resulting from
excessive claims to benefits.
d2014 situation.
eThe impact of full financial risk for insurers combined with limited risk adjustment on efficiency depends on the relative magnitude of i) the positive
impact of financial risk on the effort that the insurer puts in acting as a prudent buyer of LTC and ii) the negative impact of the limited risk adjustment
on the quantity and the quality of the care that the insurer contracts and on how it allocates this care.
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Belgium and Switzerland rely heavily on cost sharing
as a strategy to counteract moral hazard (Table 1). In
Switzerland, cost sharing consists of deductibles and
co-payments. These co-payments are independent of
income but poor individuals are eligible for subsidies.
In Belgium, co-payments are income-related and
capped while the additional cash benefits at the
national level are means-tested.
The demand is further constrained by excluding some
LTC services from the benefit package, such as accom-
modation costs.7,10 Furthermore, benefits are provided
in kind. Yet, in Belgium additional cash benefits are
available to compensate the elderly for the additional
costs of living in poor health and domestic help is sub-
sidized by government service vouchers.7 In Belgium,
eligibility for medical LTC and the means-tested
national cash allowances for assistance is assessed by a
federal government service doctor according to national
guidelines focusing on health and disability; eligibility
assessment for cash benefits for non-medical LTC is
done at the regional level. Home care providers are
required to give priority to low-income patients
(Wallonia) and patients without informal care
(Flanders).10 In Switzerland, eligibility is assessed by
providers and is based not only on criteria related to
disability and health status but, for non-medical LTC
only, also on criteria related to the availability of infor-
mal care. Both Swiss and Belgian insurers have a formal
role in need assessment by conducting audits and thus
they can indirectly influence the eligibility decisions.
The Netherlands and Germany
The Netherlands and Germany have separate public
insurance schemes for LTC and either regional single
payers (the Netherlands – until 2015) or sickness funds
and private insurers (Germany) organize LTC and con-
tract LTC providers. Eligibility is assessed according to
national guidelines and entrusted to independent agen-
cies in both countries, although in the Netherlands pro-
viders can in some cases perform reassessments.
Consequently, providers and insurers can only indir-
ectly, if at all, influence eligibility decisions. The eligi-
bility criteria are related to disability and health status.
In the Netherlands, eligibility for non-medical LTC
also depended on the availability of informal care.11–13
The amount of LTC benefits in Germany depends on
the level of disability – four benefit levels are distinguished
– and on the patient’s choice to live at home or move to a
nursing home but does not depend on income or actual
use. The benefits are usually not sufficient to cover the
costs of LTC and patients pay the difference. These sub-
stantial out-of-pocket payments are believed to make
patients cost-conscious. Therefore, moral hazard is cur-
rently not considered a major issue.14
Substantial cost sharing may endanger access to
good quality LTC, particularly for poorer patients.
The out-of-pocket payments may be too high for
them and a separate means-tested programme covers
part of the out-of-pocket payments for this group. In
the Netherlands, co-payments are lower than in
Germany and income-related. Furthermore, coverage
is more restricted in Germany than in the
Netherlands. For instance, the costs of accommodation
in LTC institutions are covered by LTC insurance in
the Netherlands but not in Germany.11,12 Indeed,
poorer patients in Germany have less access to formal
LTC than affluent individuals, while in the Netherlands
LTC use is not associated with income.13
In both countries, patients can opt for cash benefits
but it is lower than the monetary value of in-kind trans-
fers. There is a discount of 25% in the Netherlands and
of 50% in Germany.11,12
Current policies targeting the insurer
Managed competition among risk bearing insurers may
encourage them to promote efficiency while guarantee-
ing access. The potential of managed competition
depends on the ability to empower the competing
insurers and to mitigate potential adverse effects of
the financial incentives for efficiency. That is, being a
prudent buyer of LTC and ensuring an appropriate
allocation of LTC should positively affect an insurer’s
financial position. Three important determinants of the
insurers’ incentives are: whether the insurers bear any
financial risk; if so, whether risk adjustment ensures
that this financial risk provides appropriate incentives
for efficiency; and whether health insurance and LTC
insurance are integrated.
Financial risk and risk adjustment
Managed competition involving mandatory cross-sub-
sidies between risk groups (e.g. through community-
rated premiums), financial risk for insurers and
competition among insurers may give these insurers
strong financial incentives for selection. In public insur-
ance schemes with managed competition, these incen-
tives for risk selection are typically reduced by a system
of risk equalization.1 Finding risk adjusters that reduce
insurers’ incentives for risk selection against patients
needing LTC yet preserve the incentives for efficiency
is a major challenge.1,2,15
So far, the experience with financial risk and risk
equalization in LTC insurance is limited. In the
Netherlands (until 2015) and Germany, insurers do
not compete for patients and are retrospectively com-
pensated from a central fund for providing LTC
coverage and therefore are not at risk.11,12
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Consequently, they play little role in promoting effi-
cient use or provision of LTC. By contrast, in
Belgium and Switzerland, LTC is partly covered
through the health insurance scheme and insurers
compete and bear financial risk. In these countries,
insurers receive risk-adjusted subsidies for their enro-
lees. In Belgium, the financial risk for insurers is lim-
ited to 8% of losses incurred on medical expenses. In
Switzerland, insurers bear the full financial risk.
Belgium is the only country with a risk equalization
scheme that compensates health insurers for having
enrolees using LTC. However, for two reasons it is
unclear whether this compensation is adequate and
thus counteracts risk selection. First, insurers bear
only limited financial risk and competition among
insurers is weak.16,17 It is therefore not clear whether
the current risk adjusters would be sufficient to prevent
risk selection if the degree of financial risk and compe-
tition are substantial. Second, the adequacy of the risk
adjustment scheme may depend on the type of LTC
services covered: medical LTC may be more predict-
able than non-medical LTC because the latter is partly
contingent on the availability of social support.
The current Belgian risk-adjustment formula
contains six variables that are clearly related to LTC
use. Two variables, living alone and being a widow,
widower or orphan, meet the criteria for good risk
adjusters,1 but their validity is doubtful because it
includes individuals of all ages. The other variables
included in the risk adjustment formula are based on
past or current entitlements, e.g. having a long term
condition, which is determined using drug prescrip-
tions.17 To date, there is no evidence that perverse
incentives from risk adjustment based on past LTC
use have affected insurers’ behaviour.
In contrast to the extensive risk adjustment scheme in
Belgium, the Swiss formula for risk-adjusted subsidies
only includes age, sex and the previous year’s inpatient
stays, including to nursing homes, and hence picks up
little variation in expected LTC expenditures. Therefore,
incentives to select against patients needing LTC are
strong. Furthermore, because inpatient stays increase
next year’s capitation payment but home care does
not, insurers have incentives to institutionalize their
enrolees, even more so if it may lower expenditures.
Integration of health and LTC insurance
Managed competition may be expanded to LTC by
integration into public insurance or by introducing
managed competition in a separate LTC insurance
scheme.
Integration is necessary to avoid inefficient substitu-
tion of care, discontinuity of care and excessive hospi-
talization. But integration may only lead to efficient
substitution of LTC and health care if insurers are at
risk for both types of care and have appropriate incen-
tives. If insurers are only at risk for health care expend-
itures, however, as is currently the case in Germany and
the Netherlands, integration may result in inefficient
substitution of LTC for medical care as long as insurers
are not at risk for LTC expenses. Furthermore, integra-
tion may come at the cost of increased risk selection if
risk adjustment for LTC is inadequate.
Conclusion
Comprehensive, affordable and universal public insur-
ance for LTC ensures that everyone has financial access
to care. Yet, unconstrained public LTC insurance is
likely to suffer from moral hazard, which may result
in inefficient allocation and excessive expenditures.
These negative consequences may be limited through,
among other things, demand-side strategies targeting
the patient or the insurer.
In all four countries, the adverse impact of moral
hazard on efficiency is controlled through demand-side
measures, yet the importance of each and hence their
net impact on efficiency and universal access vary. The
effect that demand-side measures are expected to have
on the efficiency of the system and the access to LTC
could guide future research.
Managed competition has been pursued in
Belgium and Switzerland and, since 2015, in the
Netherlands as home care has been transferred from
public LTC insurance into the health insurance
scheme. A crucial precondition for the effectiveness
of managed competition in LTC is to provide
insurers with appropriate incentives. However, the
prospects of fulfilling this precondition are unclear
because little is known about the feasibility of ade-
quate risk equalization for LTC and the specific actu-
arial features of LTC use may make developing
adequate risk adjusters difficult. In addition, incentives
for efficiency depend on whether health insurance and
LTC insurance are integrated, necessary to avoid
inefficient substitution of care, discontinuity of care
and excessive hospitalization. But integration only
has a positive impact if the insurers have the appro-
priate incentives.
Appropriate risk adjusters for LTC use are not only
a necessary precondition for effective managed compe-
tition in public LTC insurance but may also be import-
ant for managed competition in health insurance. Even
in a separate health insurance scheme, competing
health insurers have an incentive to select against
patients needing LTC if, after risk equalization, they
have higher expected health care expenditures than
others. This situation seems to be relevant for all coun-
tries with such a scheme because even in the case of the
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sophisticated Dutch risk equalization scheme, health
insurers currently incur substantial losses on the med-
ical cost of LTC patients.18
In addition to the preconditions ensuring appropri-
ate incentives for insurers, there are others necessary
for successful managed competition. For example,
insurers need to be able to prevent providers giving
excessive (or excessively expensive) services because
people are covered by public LTC insurance.3
Hence, insurers need to be able to negotiate prices,
volume and quality with providers. Currently, in
none of the four countries did insurers negotiate con-
tracts with LTC providers; volume and prices are
largely or fully determined by the government.7,10,12,19
Only in Germany, insurers collectively negotiate
prices with each provider and have somewhat more
room for negotiations than in other countries as there
are no supply constraints.16 So at best, insurers in the
four countries can negotiate quality and steer patients
towards well-performing providers.
In addition to these concerns, there are institutional
and cultural preconditions for managed competition,
such as the presence of a sufficient number of well-
informed patients who can discipline insurers to con-
tract efficient and good quality LTC.20 Even when man-
aged competition is technically, institutionally and
culturally feasible, the broader question is which
model is the most appropriate for financing and orga-
nizing the provision of LTC services. To answer this
question, a full comparison of alternative options for
publicly funding and purchasing LTC is required.
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